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The modern theory of capital structure was established by Modigliani
and Miller (1958). Thirty-seven years later, Rajan and Zingales (1995,
p. 1421) stated: “Theory has clearly made some progress on the subject. We
now understand the most important departures from the Modigliani and
Miller assumptions that make capital structure relevant to a firm’s value.
However, very little is known about the empirical relevance of the diffe-
rent theories.”
Similarly, Harris and Raviv (1991, p. 299) in their survey of capital struc-
ture theories claimed: “The models surveyed have identified a large num-
ber of potential determinants of capital structure. The empirical work so
far has not, however, sorted out which of these are important in various
contexts.” Thus, several conditional theories of capital structure exist (none
is universal), but very little is known about their empirical relevance. More-
over, the existing empirical evidence is based mainly on data from deve-
loped countries (G7 countries). Findings based on data from developing
countries have not appeared until recently – for example Booth et al. (2001)1
or Huang and Song (2002)2. So far, no study has been published based on
data from transition countries of Central and Eastern Europe, at least to
the extent of this author’s knowledge. The main goal of this paper is to fill
this gap, exploring the case of the Czech Republic.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In Section 1 the most prominent
theoretical and empirical findings are surveyed. In Section 2 the potential
determinants of capital structure are summarized and theoretical and em-
pirical evidence concerning these determinants is provided. Section 3 is
the empirical part of the paper. Here the data is described, measures of
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1 the cases of Brazil, Mexico, India, South Korea, Jordan, Malaysia, Pakistan, Thailand, Turkey
and Zimbabwe
2 the case of Chinaleverage are defined, the extent of leverage is characterized and the impact
of potential determinants of capital structure on leverage is tested. Sec-
tion 4 provides conclusions of the study.
1. Theoretical and Empirical Findings
According to Myers (2001, p. 81), “there is no universal theory of the debt-
-equity choice, and no reason to expect one”. However, there are several use-
ful conditional theories3, each of which helps to understand the debt-to-
-equity structure that firms choose. These theories can be divided into two
groups – either they predict the existence of the optimal debt-equity ratio
for each firm (so-called static trade-off models) or they declare that there is
no well-defined target capital structure (pecking-order hypothesis).
Static trade-off models understand the optimal capital structure as an op-
timal solution of a trade-off, for example the trade-off between a tax shield
and the costs of financial distress in the case of trade-off theory. According
to this theory the optimal capital structure is achieved when the marginal
present value of the tax shield on additional debt is equal to the marginal
present value of the costs of financial distress on additional debt. The trade-
-off between the benefits of signaling and the costs of financial distress in
the case of signaling theory implies that a company chooses debt ratio as
a signal about its type. Therefore in the case of a good company the debt
must be large enough to act as an incentive compatible signal, i.e., it does
not pay off for a bad company to mimic it. In the case of agency theory
thetrade-off between agency costs4stipulates that theoptimal capital struc-
ture is achieved when agency costs are minimized. Finally, the trade-off be-
tween costs of financial distress and increase of efficiency in the case of free
cash-flow theory, which is designed mainly for firms with extra-high free
cash-flows, suggests that the high debt ratio disciplines managers to pay
out cash instead of investing it below the cost of capital or wasting it on or-
ganisational inefficiencies. On theother hand, thepecking-order theory sug-
gests that there is no optimal capital structure. Firms are supposed to pre-
fer internal financing (retained earnings) to external funds. When internal
cash-flow is not sufficient to finance capital expenditures, firms will bor-
row, rather than issue equity. Therefore there is no well-defined optimal
leverage, because there are two kinds of equity, internal and external, one
at the top of the pecking order and one at the bottom.5
Existing empirical evidence is based mainly on data from developed coun-
tries. For example Bradley et al. (1984), Kim and Sorensen (1986), Friend
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3 The most prominent theories are the trade-off theory, the signaling theory (first mentioned by
(Ross, 1977)), the agency theory (Jensen – Meckling, 1976), (Myers, 1977), the free cash-flow
theory (Jensen, 1986), and the pecking-order theory (Myers – Majluf, 1984), (Myers, 1984). For
more details about conditional capital structure theories see (Bauer – Bubák, 2003).
4 Agency costs arise from two agency relations – the relation between owners and debt hold-
ers and the relation between owners and managers (non-owners), i.e., principal-agent rela-
tion.
5 For a comprehensive survey of capital structure theories see (Harris – Raviv, 1991), for theo-
ries based on asymmetric information see (Klein et al., 2002).and Lang (1988), Titman and Wessels (1988) and Chaplinsky and Niehaus
(1993) focus on United States companies; Kester (1986) compares United
States and Japanese manufacturing corporations; Rajan and Zingales
(1995) examine firms from G7 countries; and Wald (1999) uses data for
G7 countries except Canada and Italy. Findings based on data from deve-
loping countries have appeared only in recent years, for example Booth et
al. (2001) or Huang and Song (2002).6
Concerning the Czech Republic, no study has been published focusing on
the determinants of capital structure, at least to the extent of this au-
thor’s knowledge. Krauseová (1995) describes the capital structure of Czech
firms in the period from 1990 to 1993. Bauer and Bubák (2003) test for
the existence of optimal capital structure and for relevance of signaling the-
ory in the case of Czech listed firms. Their results support the existence of
optimal capital structure and they are in accordance with the signaling the-
ory. Dvoﬁák (2000) analyses financing of Czech companies. According to his
results, thecapital market in theCzech Republic is not analternative source
of financing. Because Czech companies pay free cash to the shareholders
only rarely, the financing comes mainly from internal equity (retained ear-
nings). The only alternative is a bank loan, implying that the capital struc-
ture reflects only the firm’s cumulative needs for external funds. Therefore,
the debt-equity ratio is not the strategic choice of a firm, but only an indi-
cator of the firm’s ability to generate sufficient cash-flow for its capital in-
vestment program. This would be consistent with the pecking-order hy-
pothesis.
2. Determinants of Capital Structure
As Harris and Raviv (1991, p. 334) state: “Several studies shed light on
the specific characteristics of firms and industries that determine leverage
ratios. [...] These studies generally agree that leverage increases with fixed
assets, non-debt tax shields, growth opportunities, and firm size and de-
creases with volatility, advertising expenditures, research and development
expenditures, bankruptcy probability, profitability and uniqueness of
the product.” However, the results of both theoretical and empirical stu-
dies are not always unambiguous.
Based on the data availability, the following determinants of capital
structure are analysed in this paper: size, profitability, tangibility, growth
opportunities, tax, non-debt tax shields, volatility, and industry classifica-
tion.
2.1 Size
From the theoretical point of view, the effect of size on leverage is am-
biguous. As Rajan and Zingales (1995, p. 1451) claim: “Larger firms tend to
be more diversified and fail less often, so size (computed as the logarithm
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6 See footnotes 1 and 2.of net sales) may be an inverse proxy for the probability of bankruptcy. If
so, size should have a positive impact on the supply debt. However, size may
also be a proxy for the information outside investors have, which should in-
crease their preference for equity relative to debt.”
Also empirical studies do not provide us with clear information. Some au-
thors find a positive relation between size and leverage, for example Huang
and Song (2002), Rajan and Zingales (1995)7 and Friend and Lang (1988).
On the other hand, some studies report a negative relation, for example
(Kester, 1986), (Kim – Sorensen, 1986) and (Titman – Wessels, 1988). More-
over, the results are very often weak as far as the level of statistical sig-
nificance is concerned.
To proxy for the size of a company, the natural logarithm of sales is used
in this study (as it is in most studies of similar character). Another possi-
bility is to proxy the size of a company by the natural logarithm of total as-
sets. In this study there is a high correlation between the natural logarithm
of total assets and thenatural logarithm of sales (0.68 in 2000, 0.70 in 2001),
therefore the use of the natural logarithm of total assets as a proxy vari-
able for the size of a company should lead to similar results.
2.2 Profitability
There are no consistent theoretical predictions on the effects of profit-
ability on leverage. From the point of view of the trade-off theory, more prof-
itable companies should have higher leverage because they have more in-
come to shield from taxes. The free cash-flow theory would suggest that
more profitable companies should use more debt in order to discipline ma-
nagers, to induce them to pay out cash instead of spending money on inef-
ficient projects. However, from the point of view of the pecking-order the-
ory, firms prefer internal financing to external. So more profitable com-
panies have a lower need for external financing and therefore should have
lower leverage.
Most empirical studies observe a negative relationship between leverage
and profitability, for example (Rajan – Zingales, 1995)8, (Huang – Song,
2002), (Booth et al., 2001), (Titman – Wessels, 1988), (Friend – Lang, 1988)
and (Kester, 1986).
In this study, profitability is proxied by return on assets (defined as ear-
nings before interest and taxes divided by total assets).
2.3 Tangibility
It is assumed, from the theoretical point of view, that tangible assets can
be used as collateral. Therefore higher tangibility lowers the risk of a credi-
tor and increases the value of the assets in the case of bankruptcy. As Booth
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7 for all G7 countries, except Germany
8 for all G7 countries, except Germanyet al. (2001, p. 101) state: “The more tangible the firm’s assets, the greater
its ability to issue secured debt and the less information revealed about fu-
ture profits.” Thus a positive relation between tangibility and leverage is
predicted.
Several empirical studies confirm this suggestion, such as (Rajan – Zin-
gales, 1995), (Friend – Lang, 1988) and (Titman – Wessels, 1988) find. On
the other hand, for example Booth et al. (2001) and Huang and Song (2002)
experience a negative relation between tangibility and leverage.
In this study, tangibility is defined as tangible assets divided by total as-
sets.
2.4 Growth Opportunities
According to Myers (1977), firms with high future growth opportunities
should use more equity financing, because a higher leveraged company is
more likely to pass up profitable investment opportunities. As Huang and
Song (2002, p. 9) claim: “Such an investment effectively transfers wealth
from stockholders to debtholders.” Therefore a negative relation between
growth opportunities and leverage is predicted. As market-to-book ratio is
used in order to proxy for growth opportunities, there is one more reason
to expect a negative relation – as Rajan and Zingales (1995, p. 1455) point
out: “The theory predicts that firms with high market-to-book ratios have
higher costs of financial distress, which is why we expect a negative corre-
lation.”
Some empirical studies confirm the theoretical prediction, such as (Ra-
jan – Zingales, 1995), (Kim – Sorensen, 1986) or (Titman – Wessels, 1988)
report. However, for example, Kester (1986) and Huang and Song (2002)
demonstrate a positive relation between growth opportunities and lever-
age.
In this study, the P/B ratio (market-to-book ratio) is used as a proxy for
growth opportunities.
2.5 Tax
According to thetrade-off theory, acompany with ahigher tax rate should
use more debt and therefore should have higher leverage, because it has
more income to shield from taxes. However, for example Fama and French
(1998) declare that debt has no net tax benefits. As MacKie-Mason (1990,
p. 1471) claims: “Nearly everyone believes taxes must be important to fi-
nancing decision, but little support has been found in empirical analysis.”
As he also points out (MacKie-Mason, 1990, p. 1471): “This paper provides
clear evidence of substantial tax effects on the choice between issuing debt
or equity; most studies fail to find significant effects. [...] Other papers miss
the fact that most tax shields have a negligible effect on the marginal tax
rate for most firms. New predictions are strongly supported by an empi-
rical analysis; the method is to study incremental financing decisions us-
ing discrete choice analysis. Previous researchers examined debt-equity
ratios, but tests based on incremental decisions should have greater power.”
As he adds, debt-equity ratios “are the cumulative result of years of sepa-
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likely to have low power for effects at the margin.” (MacKie-Mason, 1990,
p. 1472).
However, as data to perform similar analysis as (MacKie-Mason, 1990) is
not available in the Czech Republic, the average tax rate defined as the dif-
ference between earnings before taxes and earnings after taxes, scaled by
earnings before taxes, is used as a proxy variable to analyse the tax effects
on leverage in this study.
2.6 Non-debt Tax Shields
Other items apart from interest expenses, which contribute to a de-
crease in tax payments, are labelled as non-debt tax shields (for exam-
ple the tax deduction for depreciation). According to Angelo – Masulis
(1980, p. 21): “Ceteris paribus, decreases in allowable investment-re-
lated tax shields (e.g., depreciation deductions or investment tax cre-
dits) due to changes in the corporate tax code or due to changes in in-
flation which reduce the real value of tax shields will increase
the amount of debt that firms employ. In cross-sectional analysis, firms
with lower investment related tax shields (hol-ding before-tax earnings
constant) will employ greater debt in their capital structures.” So they
argue that non-debt tax shields are substitutes for a debt-related tax
shield and therefore therelation between non-debt tax shields and lever-
age should be negative.
Some empirical studies confirm the theoretical prediction, for example
Kim and Sorensen (1986, p. 140) declare: “DEPR9 has a significantly nega-
tive coefficient. [...] This is consistent with the notion that depreciation is
an effective tax shield, and thus offsets the tax shield benefits of leverage.”
Anegative relation between non-debt tax shields and leverage is also found
by (Huang – Song, 2002) and (Titman – Wessels, 1988). However, for exam-
ple Bradley et al. (1984) and Chaplinsky and Niehaus (1993) observe a po-
sitive relationship between non-debt tax shields and leverage.
Depreciation divided by total assets is used in order to proxy for non-debt
tax shields in this study.
2.7 Volatility
Volatility may be understood as a proxy for risk of a firm (probability of
bankruptcy). Therefore it is assumed that volatility is negatively related to
leverage. However, as Huang and Song (2002, p. 9) state based on findings
of Hsia (1981): “As the variance of the value of the firm’s assets increases,
the systematic risk of equity decreases. So the business risk is expected to
be positively related to leverage.”
The positive relation between volatility and leverage is confirmed by (Kim
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9 Kim and Sorensen (1986, p. 138) define DEPR as the average rate of depreciation, i.e., depre-
ciation charges divided by fixed assets.– Sorensen, 1986) and (Huang – Song, 2002). Conversely, a negative rela-
tion is found by (Bradley et al., 1984) and (Titman – Wessels, 1988).
In this study, standard deviation of return on assets is used as a proxy
for volatility.
2.8 Industry Classification
Some empirical studies identify a statistically significant relationship be-
tween industry classification and leverage, such as (Bradley et al., 1984),
(Long – Malitz, 1985), and (Kester, 1986). As Harris and Raviv (1991, p. 333)
claim, based on a survey of empirical studies: “Drugs, Instruments, Elec-
tronics, and Food have consistently low leverage while Paper, Textile Mill
Products, Steel, Airlines, and Cement have consistently large leverage.”
To estimate the effect of industry classification on leverage, firms in our
sample are divided into groups according to the Industrial Classification of
Economic Activities of the Czech Statistical Office. The following classifi-
cation is used in order to create reasonably large groups of firms: C – Mi-
ning of Raw Materials, D – Manufacturing, and E – Production and Dis-
tribution of Electricity, Gas, and Water. Firms not belonging to any of these
groups make up the reference group. Titman (1984) and Titman and Wes-
sels (1988) point out that firms manufacturing machines and equipment
should be financed with relatively less debt. Because group D is sufficiently
large, it is possible to drop the firms that belong to sub-industry 29 (Manu-
facturing and Repair of Machines and Equipment) and create from these
firms the group D1.
Therefore four dummy variables are used in the empirical analysis to es-
timate the effect of industry classification on leverage – C, D, D1, and E.
Table 1 provides a brief summary of theoretical and empirical findings
(except for industry dummies).
3. Empirical Analysis
3.1 Data Description
Data used in the analysis were collected from financial reports of com-
panies as available on the Prague Stock Exchange website and in the Se-
curities Centre of the Czech Republic data base; prices of ordinary shares
at year-end were obtained from “Burzovní noviny”, the official stock mar-
ket supplement to the “Hospodáﬁské noviny” daily. The data are based on
financial reports according to Czech Accounting Standards (the only data
available for all companies).
The sample comprises a total of 74 companies listed on the Prague Stock
Exchange within the period from 2000 to 2001 (i.e., all non-financial com-
panies traded on the Prague Stock Exchange in November 2002).
After a data set investigation it was decided to exclude 2 companies – one
because of negative book value and one because of unusual changes in ba-
lance sheet items between the years 2000 and 2001. Therefore the final
sample comprises 72 observations for each year.
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This study uses data based on Czech Accounting Standards and hence
the comparison of the results obtained for other countries can be inaccu-
rate. Each country, in fact, has its own specific accounting practices, which
cause difficulty in comparison – for example Rajan and Zingales (1995) use
the Global Vantage database for G7 countries and they still experience dif-
ferences in accounting practices). Therefore any comparison undertaken
ought to keep this shortage in mind.
Table 2 reports the average balance sheet for the years 2000 and 2001.
Only items used in later analysis are described.
Several interesting observations can be made from the average balance
sheet as reported in Table 2. The proportion of tangible assets is relatively
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Theoretical G7 Countries Developed Developing China
prediction countries countries
Size +/– +(–) –a(+a) +(–) +
Profitability +/– –(+b) –(+a)– –
Tangibility + + + –(+) –
Growth 
opportunities – – –a(+) +(–) +
Tax+ –(+) +b
Non-debt tax 
shields – +(–) –
Volatility +/– -–(+) –(+) +
TABLE 1 Summary of Theoretical and Empirical Findings
Source: G7 Countries: (Rajan – Zingales, 1995)
Developed countries: (Harris – Raviv, 1991), i.e., a survey of the following empirical studies: (Bradley, et al.,
1984), (Chaplinsky – Niehaus, 1990), (Friend – Hasbrouck, 1988), (Friend – Lang, 1988),
(Gonedes, et al., 1988), (Long – Malitz, 1985), (Kester, 1986), (Kim – Sorensen, 1986),
(Marsh, 1982), (Titman – Wessels, 1988)
Developing countries: (Booth et al., 2001)
China: (Huang – Song, 2002)
Notes: a According to (Harris – Raviv, 1991, p. 336): “Indicates that the result was either not statistically signifi-
cantly different from zero at conventional significance levels or that the result was weak in a non-sta-
tistical sense.”
b Indicates that the result is weak in a statistical sense.
Item Line 2000 2001
Total assets 001 100 100
Tangible assets 012 53 52
Total liabilities + Shareholders’ funds 061 100 100
Shareholders’ funds 062 58 59
Liabilities 079 39 38
Reserves 080 3 3
Long-term liabilities 084 4 3
Short-term liabilities 091 20 21
Bank loans and short-term notes 101 12 11
Other liabilities 105 3 3
TABLE 2 Selected Items of the Average Balance Sheet (N = 72 companies)
Note: First, the respective item for each firm was scaled by total assets and then averaged across all firms in the sam-
ple. Subsequently it was multiplied by 100, thus, the reported values are in % of total assets.high on the assets side of the balance sheet – higher than in the case of six
from the group of G7 countries – and it is very similar as in the case of
Canada.10 On the side of liabilities, Czech companies exhibit a much higher
proportion of equity than companies in G7 countries. They also use a lower
share of long-term debt than companies in most G7 countries and the domi-
nant role in total liabilities represent short-term liabilities. Here the prob-
lem arises how to measure the leverage of a company. As Rajan and Zin-
gales (1995, p. 1427) state: “Clearly, the extent of leverage – and the most
relevant measure – depends on the objective of the analysis.” A discussion
concerning the different measures of leverage can be found in (Rajan – Zin-
gales, 1995, pp. 1427–1433)
In this study, the main purpose is to analyse the determinants of capital
structure. Therefore as a basic definition of leverage we use the ratio of to-
tal liabilities to total assets (i.e., the non-equity share of total assets – there-
fore one minus this measure can be interpreted as “what is left for share-
holders in the case of liquidation”). However, if leverage is viewed as a piece
of information on how a firm is financed, then the ratio of total liabilities
to total assets is not the best measure. According to Rajan and Zingales
(1995, p. 1429): “The effects of past financing decisions is probably best re-
presented by the ratio of total debt to capital (defined as total debt plus 
equity).” Therefore, the ratio of total debt to capital (defined as total debt
plus equity) is used as a second measure of leverage in this study. Both mea-
sures of leverage are used in book value as well as in market value (thus
four measures of leverage are used in this study; they are summarized in
Table 3).
Table 4 shows the extent of leverage (as defined in Table 3) for selected
developed and developing countries.
As can be seen in Table 4, Book Total Liabilities Ratio (TL) in the Czech
Republic is much lower than in G7 countries. It is also lower than in most
developing countries (only Brazil and Mexico exhibit a lower TL value,
China, Malaysia and Zimbabwe show similar values). In general, develop-
ing countries seem to have a lower TL value than G7 countries, so firms in
developing countries have a higher share of equity in total assets. Measured
by Book Total Debt Ratio (TD), the Czech Republic shows similar values as
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TL Book Total Liabilities Ratio Total Liabilities / (Total Liabilities + BV Equity)
TD Book Total Debt Ratio Total Debt / (Total Debt + BV Equity)
MTL Market Total Liabilities Ratio Total Liabilities / (Total Liabilities + MV Equity)
MTD Market Total Debt Ratio Total Debt / (Total Debt + MV Equity)
TABLE 3 Measures of Leverage
Notes: BV Equity denotes Book value of equity, MV Equity denotes Market value of equity. According to data avail-
ability, Total Debt is defined as Long-term liabilities plus Short-term liabilities plus Bank loans and short-
-term notes.
10 It is possible to compare the average balance sheet with G7 countries as reported in (Rajan
– Zingales, 1995, p. 1428). Unfortunately, the comparison is not based on the same year 
(the G7 countries report is based on the year 1991). However, it is made just to illustrate the
basic differences across countries.G7 countries. The TD value for developing countries is not available except
for China, which exhibits a lower TD value than G7 countries (and com-
pared to the Czech Republic). Different results are obtained when leverage
is measured in market value. Because of a very low P/B ratio in the Czech
Republic (for more details, see below), the value of Market Total Liabilities
Ratio (MTL) in the case of the Czech Republic is higher than in G7 count-
ries (only Italy exhibits a higher MTL value, France shows a similar value).
China presents a very special case; the reason is given below where P/B ra-
tios are discussed. Measured by Market Total Debt Ratio (MTD), the value
of leverage is much higher in the Czech Republic than in G7 countries or
China (which is again a very special case). Therefore the Czech Republic
shows relatively low leverage if measured in book value, but relatively high
if measured in market value.
3.3 Determinants of Capital Structure
As stated in Chapter 2, eight possible determinants of leverage are ana-
lysed in this study. They are summarized in Table 5, descriptive statistics
of both dependent and explanatory variables and the size of industry groups
are reported in Table 6, and an international comparison of descriptive
statistics of explanatory variables (except for industry dummies) is shown
in Table 7.
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Country Obs. Period TL TD MTL MTD
Czech Republic 72 2000 0.44 (0.42) 0.41 (0.39) 0.65 (0.62) 0.60 (0.59)
Czech Republic 72 2001 0.40 (0.41) 0.36 (0.37) 0.66 (0.62) 0.62 (0.58)
USA 2580 1991 0.58 (0.66) 0.37 (0.37) 0.44 (0.44) 0.28 (0.32)
Japan 514 1991 0.69 (0.67) 0.53 (0.52) 0.45 (0.45) 0.29 (0.31)
Germany 191 1991 0.73 (0.72) 0.38 (0.39) 0.60 (0.56) 0.23 (0.28)
France 225 1991 0.71 (0.69) 0.48 (0.46) 0.64 (0.61) 0.41 (0.41)
Italy 118 1991 0.70 (0.67) 0.47 (0.46) 0.70 (0.67) 0.46 (0.47)
UK 608 1991 0.54 (0.57) 0.28 (0.29) 0.40 (0.42) 0.19 (0.23)
Canada 318 1991 0.56 (0.61) 0.39 (0.39) 0.49 (0.47) 0.35 (0.36)
China 954 2000 0.45 (0.46) 0.28 (0.31) 0.12 (0.14) 0.06 (0.08)
Brazil 49 85–91 0.30 N/A N/A N/A
Mexico 99 84–90 0.35 N/A N/A N/A
India 99 80–90 0.67 N/A N/A N/A
South Korea 93 80–90 0.73 N/A N/A N/A
Jordan 38 83–90 0.47 N/A N/A N/A
Malaysia 96 83–90 0.42 N/A N/A N/A
Pakistan 96 80–87 0.66 N/A N/A N/A
Thailand 64 83–90 0.49 N/A N/A N/A
Turkey 45 83–90 0.59 N/A N/A N/A
Zimbabwe 48 80–88 0.42 N/A N/A N/A
TABLE 4 Extent of Leverage in Selected Countries, Median (Mean)
Source: Czech Republic: own calculations; G7 countries: (Rajan – Zingales, 1995); China: (Huang – Song, 2002);
other countries: (Booth et al., 2001)The explanation of descriptive statistics is best in the context of an in-
ternational comparison as shown in Table 7.
In general, the firm SIZE is higher in G7 countries than in developing
countries including theCzech Republic. Among G7countries, values of SIZE
are very similar. The value of SIZE in the Czech Republic is higher than in
most other developing countries. In the Czech Republic, the value of ROA
is slightly lower than in G7 countries and much lower than in developing
countries. The value of ROA is 1.5 points higher in developing countries
than in G7 countries. The highest profitability is exhibited by firms in Thai-
land and Zimbabwe; in G7 countries firms in the UK show the highest profi-
tability. Tangibility in the Czech Republic is higher than in G7 countries
except Canada, where the value is similar. Only in two developing count-
ries, Brazil and Malaysia, is the tangibility higher than in the Czech Re-
public. In general, tangibility is higher in developing countries than in de-
veloped countries.
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SIZE Size ln Sales
ROA Profitability EBIT/TA
TANG Tangibility Tangible Assets/TA
PB Growth opportunities P/B ratio
TAX Average tax rate (EBT – E)/EBT
NDTS Non-debt tax shields Depreciation/TA
VOLTY Volatility SD (ROA)
IND_C Industry dummy = 1 if the firm belongs to Mining of Raw Materials; = 0 otherwise
IND_D Industry dummy = 1 if the firm belongs to Manufacturing, except for Manufacturing
and Repair of Machines and Equipment; = 0 otherwise
IND_D1 Industry dummy = 1 if the firm belongs to Manufacturing and Repair of Machines and
Equipment; = 0 otherwise
IND_E Industry dummy = 1 if the firm belongs to Production and Distribution of Electricity,
Gas, and Water; = 0 otherwise
TABLE 5 Determinants of Capital Structure
Note: TAX is defined as TAX = 0 in cases where the value of TAX is outside the interval <0;1> (for example when
both EBT and E are negative and EBT>E). This happened in 10 cases in 2000, and in 3 cases in 2001.
2000 Obs. Mean Median Min. Max. SD 2001 Obs. Mean Median Min. Max. SD
TL 72 0.42 0.44 0.07 0.96 0.19 TL 72 0.41 0.40 0.01 0.95 0.20
TD 72 0.39 0.41 0.00 0.95 0.20 TD 72 0.37 0.36 0.00 0.94 0.21
MTL 72 0.62 0.65 0.10 0.98 0.23 MTL 72 0.62 0.66 0.02 0.99 0.23
MTD 72 0.59 0.60 0.00 0.97 0.24 MTD 72 0.58 0.62 0.02 0.99 0.25
SIZE 72 21.47 21.84 11.78 24.71 2.17 SIZE 72 21.52 21.89 11.87 24.68 2.16
ROA 72 0.06 0.05 –0.21 0.71 0.12 ROA 72 0.05 0.05 -0.27 0.37 0.09
TANG 72 0.53 0.59 0.00 0.95 0.25 TANG 72 0.52 0.55 0.00 0.93 0.26
PB 72 0.53 0.39 0.02 2.11 0.43 PB 72 0.47 0.37 0.03 2.25 0.38
TAX 72 0.21 0.24 0.00 0.66 0.18 TAX 72 0.22 0.26 0.00 0.74 0.18
NDTS 72 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.10 0.03 NDTS 72 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.12 0.03
VOLTY 72 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.31 0.04 VOLTY 72 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.31 0.04
Obs (IND_C) = 8 Obs (IND_D) = 17 Obs (IND_D1) = 8 Obs (IND_E) = 25
TABLE 6 Descriptive StatisticsThe most interesting comparison concerns the value of PB. In the Czech
Republic, the P/B ratio is the lowest of all the countries reported in Table 7.
Three other developing countries, South Korea, Pakistan and Zimbabwe,
also exhibit a P/B ratio less than one. There is the opposite situation in all
G7 countries, where the lowest P/B ratio is exhibited by Italy (exactly one).
In all other countries the P/B value is greater than one. China is a very spe-
cial case, the average value of P/B ratio is over five; therefore leverage in
market value is much lower than leverage in book value.
The value of TAX is not available for G7 countries except for the USA,
where the value is higher than that of the Czech Republic. In developing
countries, in four cases, the value of TAX is lower. It is the same in the case
of India and in six other cases it is higher than in the Czech Republic.
The value of NDTS is available only for two other countries. Asensible com-
parison is, therefore, not possible. However, the value of NDTS is highest
in USA and lowest in China. The value of VOLTY is lower in the Czech Re-
public than in G7 countries, except for Japan; the highest value is exhibi-
ted by the USA. Concerning developing countries, the value of VOLTY in
the Czech Republic is less than or equal to any of them. The value of VOLTY
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SIZE (USD) ROA TANG PB TAX NDTS VOLTY
CR 2000 17.98 (2.17) 0.06 (0.12) 0.53 (0.25) 0.53 (0.43) 0.21 (0.18) 0.05 (0.03) 0.03 (0.04)
CR 2001 18.02 (2.16) 0.05 (0.09) 0.52 (0.26) 0.47 (0.38) 0.22 (0.18) 0.05 (0.03) 0.03 (0.04)
USA 21.61 0.07 (0.08) 0.36 1.65 0.30 (0.18) 0.10 (0.04) 0.07 (0.12)
Japan 21.83 0.05 (0.03) 0.29 1.67 N/A N/A 0.02 (0.04)
UK 20.59 0.09 (0.08) 0.41 1.35 N/A N/A 0.06 (0.09)
Germany 21.65 0.06 (0.04) 0.33 1.57 N/A N/A 0.04 (0.06)
France 21.69 0.07 (0.05) 0.24 1.26 N/A N/A 0.04 (0.05)
Italy N/A N/A 0.32 1.00 N/A N/A N/A
Canada N/A N/A 0.52 1.36 N/A N/A N/A
China 19.7 (1.0) 0.08 (0.04) 0.34 (0.16) 3.19 (1.24) 0.16 (0.06) 0.02 (0.02) 0.04 (0.04)
Brazil  13.1 (1.0) 0.07 (0.12) 0.68 (0.19) N/A 0.14 (0.17) N/A 0.09 (0.05)
Mexico 11.2 (1.4)  0.08 (0.08) 0.33 (0.30) N/A 0.26 (0.57) N/A 0.06 (0.03)
India 18.4 (1.0) 0.07 (0.07) 0.41 (0.18) 1.4 (1.1) 0.22 (0.21) N/A 0.05 (0.03)
South Korea 18.9 (0.9) 0.04 (0.04) 0.49 (0.15) 0.7 (0.7) 0.30 (0.20) N/A 0.03 (0.02)
Jordan 9.8 (0.3) 0.07 (0.11) 0.47 (0.22) 1.4 (0.7) 0.16 (0.18) N/A 0.08 (0.04)
Malaysia 17.4 (1.6) 0.07 (0.07) 0.58 (0.22) 2.3 (1.8) 0.32 (0.44) N/A 0.05 (0.03)
Pakistan 17.1 (1.1) 0.09 (0.10) 0.38 (0.20) 0.9 (0.7) 0.12 (0.20) N/A 0.06 (0.04)
Thailand 16.7 (1.3) 0.13 (0.07) 0.36 (0.17) 3.2 (2.1) 0.29 (0.09) N/A 0.03 (0.03)
Turkey 17.2 (1.7) 0.10 (0.09) 0.41 (0.19) 1.9 (1.3) 0.30 (0.19) N/A 0.06 (0.03)
Zimbabwe 16.7 (1.6) 0.12 (0.09) 0.44 (0.13) 0.6 (0.6) 0.29 (0.21) N/A 0.06 (0.06)
TABLE 7 International Comparison of Descriptive Statistics, Mean (standard deviation)
Source: Czech Republic: own calculations; G7 countries: see notes below; China: (Huang – Song, 2002); other count-
ries: (Booth et al., 2001)
Notes: Number of observations and the year under analysis are the same as reported in Table 4. PB in the case of
China means Tobin’s Q (defined as market-to-book ratio of total assets); the corresponding value of P/B ra-
tio is 5.24 ((calculated from (Huang – Song, 2002)). TANG in the case of (Booth et al., 2001) is defined as to-
tal assets less current assets divided by total assets. Values for G7 countries were obtained as follows –
TANG and PB were calculated from (Rajan – Zingales, 1995); VOLTY, ROA and SIZE from (Wald, 1999), where
the same time period as in (Rajan – Zingales, 1995) is used, SIZE is defined as ln (total assets). TAX and
NDTS for USA are from (Kim – Sorensen, 1986), however, the values are from the period 1975–1980.is higher in developing countries than in G7 countries; the highest values
are recorded for Brazil and Jordan.
An empirical analysis of thedeterminants of capital structure in theCzech
Republic follows. Table 8 shows correlation coefficients of all variables.
TL, TD, MTL and MTD are dependent variables; therefore always only
one of them is explained by any model. Concerning the explanatory vari-
ables, relatively high correlation coefficients (higher than 0.5) between
NDTS and TANG and PB and ROA can be observed. Therefore there is
a possibility of multicollinearity. Generally, the presence of multicollinea-
rity in the sample poses a problem – it results in large standard errors of
the estimated regression coefficients and leads to instability of regression
estimates. However, the results prove to be relatively consistent and stable
across numerous regressions that were run. Moreover, the results are stable
and consistent also in the case of restricted models, where just one out of
two correlated explanatory variables is used.
The determinants of capital structure were analysed by using the OLS
estimation, as in most papers of similar character. Therefore the results
should be comparable with the majority of them. The results are reported
in Table 9.
Before commenting on the results, restricted models are presented in
Table 10. Restricted models are useful as tests for robustness of the results
reported in Table 9.
Theoretical prediction about the relationship of size and leverage is am-
biguous. Empirical studies experience mainly a positive relation. This is
also the result of our study. SIZE is statistically significant at the 1% level
in all the models, the sign being always positive. Thus the theory that size
is an inverse proxy for the probability of bankruptcy is supported by the re-
sults.
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TL TD MTL MTD SIZ ROA TAN PB TAX NDTS VOL I_C I_D I_D1 I_E
TL 10 .98 0.70 0.73 0.56 –0.22 0.05 0.05 0.24 0.01 –0.10 –0.17 –0.03 0.09 0.24
TD 0.99 1 0.66 0.73 0.51 –0.20 0.02 0.07 0.24 –0.03 –0.07 –0.22 –0.01 0.09 0.25
MTL 0.61 0.59 1 0.96 0.31 –0.58 0.17 –0.66 –0.07 0.15 –0.12 0.01 0.16 0.10 0.06
MTD 0.63 0.64 0.98 1 0.29 –0.55 0.14 –0.62 –0.06 0.11 –0.08 –0.06 0.19 0.12 0.09
SIZE 0.52 0.48 0.35 0.36 1 –0.06 0.41 0.18 0.28 0.38 –0.16 0.12 0.00 –0.05 0.25
ROA –0.09 –0.09 –0.45 –0.43 0.15 1 –0.11 0.62 0.27 0.00 0.43 0.07 0.04 –0.17 0.03
TANG –0.07 –0.09 0.06 0.07 0.40 0.05 1 –0.11 –0.06 0.64 –0.12 0.06 –0.13 –0.27 0.41
PB 0.03 0.06 –0.57 –0.49 0.18 0.64 –0.19 1 0.24 –0.15 0.18 –0.05 –0.09 –0.20 0.14
TAX 0.25 0.23 0.07 0.08 0.42 0.27 0.20 0.22 1 –0.08 –0.35 0.19 –0.10 –0.16 0.18
NDTS –0.09 –0.12 0.02 0.03 0.42 –0.12 0.61 –0.06 –0.01 1 –0.10 0.14 –0.07 0.07 0.01
VOLTY –0.10 –0.08 –0.11 –0.08 –0.18 –0.13 –0.26 0.06 –0.09 0.09 1 –0.09 0.09 0.11 –0.33
IND_C –0.18 –0.24 0.03 –0.06 0.12 0.08 0.05 –0.13 0.08 0.21 –0.09 1 –0.20 –0.13 –0.26
IND_D 0.07 0.09 0.25 0.28 0.01 –0.19 –0.15 –0.13 –0.16 –0.09 0.09 –0.20 1 –0.20 –0.41
IND_D10 .14 0.13 0.15 0.14 –0.04 –0.12 –0.27 –0.13 –0.33 0.02 0.11 –0.13 –0.20 1 –0.26
IND_E 0.18 0.19 –0.04 –0.03 0.22 –0.02 0.48 0.13 0.31 0.09 –0.33 –0.26 –0.41 –0.26 1
TABLE 8 Correlation Matrix (2000 left, down / 2001 right, up)There is no consistent theoretical prediction on the influence of profit-
ability on leverage. However, in the majority of empirical studies, a nega-
tive relationship between profitability and leverage is observed. This study
provides the same result. ROA is not highly statistically significant in un-
restricted models (i.e., models as reported in Table 9), however, in restricted
models it is significant in five cases; the sign is always negative. This re-
sult confirms the pecking-order theory rather than static trade-off models.
From the theoretical point of view, a positive relationship is expected be-
tween leverage and tangibility. However, based on the results of this study,
the relationship is negative. This is also the result of empirical studies for
developing countries, whereas developed countries exhibit a positive rela-
tion. The relationship between tangibility and leverage is statistically sig-
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2000 2001
N = 72 TL TD MTL MTD TL TD MTL MTD
Intercept –0.692 *** –0.671 *** –0.296 –0.325 –0.877 *** –0.835  *** –0.446** –0.535**
t (60) (–3.62) (–3.34) (–1.65) (–1.59) (–4.17) (–3.78) (–2.17) (–2 .22)
SIZE 0.055 *** 0.053 *** 0.054 *** 0.054 *** 0.071 *** 0.066 *** 0.063 *** 0.061 ***
(5.07) (4.60) (5.30) (4.61) (5.91) (5.26) (5.38) (4.45)
ROA –0.420* –0.407 –0.256 –0.285 –0.153 –0.237 –0.381 –0.591*
(–1.73) (–1.60) (–1.12) (–1.10) (–0.51) (–0.75) (–1.29) (–1.71)
TANG –0.136 –0.127 –0.111 –0.098 –0.288** –0.272* –0.213 –0.148
(–1.16) (–1.03) (–1.01) (–0.78) (–2.17) (–1.96) (–1.64) (–0.97)
PB –0.111 –0.007 –0.392 *** –0.385 *** –0.078 –0.046 –0.379*** –0.311***
(–0.17) (–0.10) (–6.46) (–5.59) (–1.08) (–0.61) (–5.36) (–3.75)
TAX 0.239** 0.243** 0.079 0.100 –0.045 –0.030 –0.048 0.014 
(2.11) (2.03) (0.74) (0.82) (–0.33) (–0.21) (–0.36) (0.09)
NDTS –1.062 –1.296 –0.856 –1.080 –0.974 –1.113 –0.756 –0.853
(–1.07) (–1.25) (–0.92) (–1.02) (–0.96) (–1.04) (–0.76) (–0.73)
VOLTY 0.353 0.412 0.625 0.803 0.186 0.239 0.193 0.310
(0.71) (0.79) (1.34) (1.51) (0.37) (0.46) (0.40) (0.54)
IND_C –0.090 –0.113 –0.011 –0.065 –0.113 –0.130 0.025 0.001
(–1.22) (–1.46) (–0.16) (–0.82) (–1.49) (–1.64) (0.34) (0.01)
IND_D 0.023 0.037 0.080 0.100 –0.034 –0.014 0.079 0.130*
(–0.40) (0.61) (1.48) (1.63) (–0.55) (–0.22) (1.32) (1.86)
IND_D1 0.102 0.107 0.064 0.071 –0.005 0.013 0.000 0.059
(–1.38) (1.38) (0.92) (0.89) (–0.06) (0.15) (–0.01) (0.64)
IND_E 0.049 0.058 0.047 0.053 0.072 0.085 0.093 0.114
(–0.83) (0.94) (0.86) (0.83) (1.13) (1.29) (1.50) (1.57)
Adj. R2 0.43 0.40 0.65 0.59 0.40 0.37 0.57 0.49
TABLE 9 OLS Estimation Results
Notes: *** = 1%,**= 5%,* = 10% level of significance. Figures under the values estimated represent t-statistics (in
parentheses).
Because the OLS method is used in order to estimate coefficients, the basic assumptions must be 
checked. The hypothesis of homoskedasticity is not rejected at the 5% level in any case, when Whi-
te’s test is applied. The hypothesis of normality is not rejected at the 5% level of significance in any case
when the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is used; when Shapiro-Wilk’s W test is employed, the hypothesis
of normality is rejected at the 5% level in two cases – MTL in 2001 and MTD in 2001. The hypothesis of
non-autocorrelation is not rejected at the 5% level in six cases when the Durbin-Watson test is utilized;
in the cases of MTL in 2000 and MTL in 2001 the result is inconclusive.nificant in two unrestricted model and in four restricted models. The sign
is always negative.
Theoretically, the expected relationship between growth opportunities
and leverage is negative. The results of this study confirm this expectation,
as do the empirical studies for developed countries. A rather positive rela-
tion is detected in developing countries. However, PB is highly statistically
significant only in cases when leverage is expressed in market value.
The theory expects a positive impact of taxes on leverage. However, em-
pirical findings are not clear. This is equally true for the results of this stu-
dy. TAX is statistically significant in two unrestricted and two restricted 
models, in which it shows a positive sign. Nevertheless, the relationship 
between TAX and leverage exhibits rather a negative sign in models for
the year 2001. However, it is statistically insignificant.
For non-debt tax shields, the results confirm theoretical prediction, i.e.,
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2000 2001
TL TD MTL MTD TL TD MTL MTD
N 70 71 68 71 72 72 69 69
Intercept -0.635*** -0.617*** -0.282** -0.331* -0.798*** -0. 761*** -0.380** -0.378*
t (N–k) (-3.88) (-3.46) (-2.03) (-1.84) (-4.27) (-3.89) (-2.50) (- 1.99)
SIZE 0.054*** 0.050*** 0.058*** 0.056*** 0.066*** 0.061*** 0.059*** 0.057***
(6.58) (5.51) (8.05) (6.02) (6.93) (6.24) (7.75) (6.15)
ROA -0.409*** -0.367** -0.380* -0.519** -0.691**
(-2.89) (-2.42) (-1.71) (-2.34) (-2.57)
TANG -0.228*** -0.165*** -0.355*** -0.330***
(-3.32) (-2.67) (-4.22) (-3.87)
PB -0.467*** -0.397*** -0.098* -0.341*** -0.298***
(-12.69) (-9.06) (-1.98) (-6.79) (-4.89)
TAX 0.265*** 0.277**
(2.79) (2.57)
NDTS -2.164*** -1.573* -1.558** -1.978**
(-2.82) (-1.94) (-2.64) (-2.77)
VOLTY
IND_C -0.145*** -0.132** -0.113* -0.109* -0.133**
(-2.89) (-2.39) (-1.95) (-1.81) (-2.10)






Adj. R 2 0.50 0.46 0.74 0.62 0.44 0.41 0.68 0.59
TABLE 10 OLS Estimation Results of Restricted Models
Notes: *** = 1%,** = 5%,* = 10% level of significance. Figures under the values estimated represent t-statistics (in
parentheses).
Results were obtained as follows. First, outliers were identified and removed from the analysis (outliers
were defined as the cases in which the standard residual value, i.e., the difference between the obser-
ved and predicted value divided by the square root of the residual mean square, was greater than   2
times the standard deviation). Consequently the least significant regressor was removed after each run
until all regressors were statistically significant at the 10% level.a negative relation to leverage. NDTS is not statistically significant in any
unrestricted model. However, it is significant in four restricted models.
The sign is always negative.
Theoretical prediction about the relation of volatility and leverage is not
clear. This study does not provide us with a clear empirical result, because
VOLTY is not statistically significant in any model.
As far as industry classification is concerned, the results show a statisti-
cally insignificant relationship between industry dummies and leverage in
unrestricted models. The restricted models reveal that firms belonging to
industry C (Mining of Raw Materials) demonstrate lower leverage, whereas
firms belonging to industries D (Manufacturing except for Manufacturing
and Repair of Machines and Equipment), D1 (Manufacturing and Repair of
Machines and Equipment), and E (Production and Distribution of Electri-
city, Gas, and Water) exhibit larger leverage than firms belonging to the re-
ference group.
According to the values of adjusted coefficient of determination (Adj. R2),
the explanatory power of models is higher when the leverage is expressed
in market value than in book value. The explanatory power of models pre-
sented in this study is, in general, relatively high compared to studies of
similar character.
Based on the fact that two measures of leverage are used in this study,
each of them in book value and in market value, that unrestricted and re-
stricted models are presented, and that two cross-sectional data samples,
i.e., data for the years 2000 and 2001, are used for analysis, the results
prove to be quite robust.
For greater clarity, the results are summarized in Table 11.
4. Conclusions
In this paper, the determinants of capital structure of listed companies
in the Czech Republic are analysed.
In general, Czech listed firms exhibit lower leverage than firms in G7count-
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Regressor Sign











TABLE 11 General Results
Note: PB is statistically significant only when leverage is expressed in market value.ries and firms in the majority of developing countries11, when measured by
Book Total Liabilities Ratio. When evaluated by Book Total Debt Ratio,
Czech companies show similar leverage as companies in G7 countries. Dif-
ferent results are obtained when leverage is expressed in market value. Be-
cause of very low P/B ratio, leverage in the Czech Republic is higher than
in G7 countries. Thus, Czech firms show relatively low leverage measured
in book value, but high leverage assessed in market value.
Based on data availability, eight potential determinants of capital struc-
ture were analysed in this paper – size, profitability, tangibility, growth op-
portunities, tax, non-debt tax shields, volatility, and industry classification.
Several interesting findings can be derived from an international com-
parison of values of proxy variables for the above-mentioned determinants
of leverage. Firms are generally bigger in G7 countries than in developing
countries including the Czech Republic. Concerning Czech firms, they are
generally bigger than firms in most developing countries. Firms in the Czech
Republic are slightly less profitable than firms in G7 countries and much
less profitable than firms in developing countries. Tangibility in the Czech
Republic is higher than in G7 countries and in most developing countries.
The P/B ratio in the Czech Republic is the lowest among all countries as
reported in this paper. Three reported developing countries (except for
the Czech Republic) exhibit a P/B ratio less than one. The opposite situa-
tion exists in all G7 countries, where the P/B ratio is greater than or equal
to one. In the USA, the average tax rate is higher than in the Czech Re-
public. The average tax rate is lower in four developing countries reported
in this study than in the Czech Republic, in one case it is the same and in
six cases it is higher. The value of non-debt tax shields is available only for
two other countries, therefore no sensible comparison is possible. The profit
volatility is on average lower in the Czech Republic than in G7 countries.
Concerning the developing countries, profit volatility in the Czech Repub-
lic is less than or equal to any of them.
According to the results of empirical analysis, leverage of Czech listed
firms is positively correlated with size, this result supports the view of size
as an inverse proxy for the probability of bankruptcy. Leverage is negatively
correlated with profitability. This finding is consistent with the pecking or-
der hypothesis rather than with static trade-off models. Anegative relation
between tangibility and leverage is in contradiction with theoretical pre-
diction. The reason for this result would need some theoretical support,
which is not provided by this study. The relationship between leverage and
P/B ratio (proxy for growth opportunities) is negative, given that the leve-
rage is measured in market value. This result confirms that firms with
higher future growth opportunities should use more equity financing.
It can be stated, on the lower level of statistical significance, that leve-
rage is positively correlated with tax, and dummy variables for Manufac-
turing except for Manufacturing and Repair of Machines and Equipment,
Manufacturing and Repair of Machines and Equipment, and Production
and Distribution of Electricity, Gas, and Water, and it is negatively corre-
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11 “Developing countries” comprise eleven developing countries reported in this study.lated with non-debt tax shields and the dummy variable for Mining of Raw
Materials.
It is problematic to speculate about these findings because of the lower
level of statistical significance. However, in the case of tax, the result is in
accordance with theoretical prediction. A negative relationship between
leverage and non-debt tax shields is in accordance with theoretical predic-
tion and shows non-debt tax shields as substitutes to debt-related tax shield.
Concerning industry dummies, it is difficult to compare the results with
other studies because sample size allows one to distinguish only a limited
number of categories. The industry classification is, moreover, based on
the Czech Statistical Office classification, which causes other problems in
comparison. However, the results prove the differences in leverage between
industries.
No relationship was found between leverage and volatility.
When it concerns size, profitability and non-debt tax shields, the results
are similar to the conclusions of most other empirical studies. In the case
of tangibility, the findings of this study correspond to the results obtained
for developing countries, whereas in the case of growth opportunities
thefindings are in accordance with theresults obtained for developed count-
ries. Results and comparisons are not clear in cases of tax and volatility.
In general, leverage of listed firms in the Czech Republic seems to be de-
termined by the same factors as leverage of listed firms in G7 countries and
in developing countries reported in this paper. The explanatory power of
models used in this study is relatively high.
Finally, several comments should be made with regard to possible limi-
tations and prospective extensions of this study.
First, as data used in this study is based on Czech Accounting Standards,
a comparison of the results with other studies is not always appropriate.
However, there is no other data available for the years 2000 and 2001.
Second, some results are either unclear or statistically insignificant. It is
reasonable to assume that had thesample been larger, theconclusions would
have been clearer and more exact. However, because of the limited number
of companies listed on the Prague Stock Exchange, it is not possible to ex-
pand the cross-sectional data set. Nevertheless, there are possible solutions
to this problem. It is possible to collect data for a longer period and to use
panel data instead of cross-sectional data, as is the case in this study. Un-
fortunately, this approach has another drawback, because leverage is there-
sult of long-run evolution. In the case of the Czech Republic, it is not fea-
sible to analyse a long enough period to obtain clearer results than what
our cross-sectional data set yielded. A more efficient approach could be to
collect data for several transition countries of Central and Eastern Europe
and analyse such a cross-sectional data set, taking into consideration dif-
ferent accounting practices of respective countries.
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This paper analyses determinants of capital structure of listed companies in
the Czech Republic during the period from 2000 to 2001. In general, leverage of
Czech listed firms is relatively low if measured in book value, but it is relatively
high if measured in market value. According to our results, leverage of a firm is po-
sitively correlated with size and it is negatively correlated with profitability and
tangibility. There is the negative relationship between leverage measured in mar-
ket value and growth opportunities. Moreover, leverage is positively correlated with
tax and negatively correlated with non-debt tax shields, albeit on a lower level of
statistical significance. This study also provides evidence concerning the relation-
ship between leverage and industry classification.
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